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VIRGINIA WEALTH TRANSFER TAX-PROPOSED
ALTERNATIVES
*Michael D. Flemming
House Resolution 34, which was approved by the House of Dele-
gates during the 1977 session of the Virginia General Assembly,
observed that Virginia's inheritance' and gift' tax laws have re-
mained essentially unchanged for more than 50 years3 and commis-
sioned a study of those laws "in light of recent developments."' The
proponents of House Resolution 34 no doubt had the 1976 amend-
ments to the federal estate and gift tax laws' fresh on their minds.
But in addition to the federal changes, several of the states have
altered their approach to transfer taxation in recent years. These
changes expand the options available to Virginia and allow Virginia
to draw on the experience of her sister states in assessing those
options.
Before any study may be begun, it should be pointed out that any
system of wealth transfer taxation must be judged against four basic
standards. The first is revenue production. The second standard is
fairness. If there is a principle of American taxation which is most
espoused it is that the burden of taxation should be allocated ac-
cording to the ability to pay. And so the fairness of a tax is generally
judged by its progressiveness: a tax rate which increases as the tax
base also increases. The third standard, predictability, is particu-
larly important with respect to transfer taxes. Lawyers and taxpay-
ers spend a great deal of time and effort planning lifetime and
testamentary transfers of property with any number of goals in
mind: minimizing tax liability, controlling the use of property after
its transfer, distributing property according to personal preference,
* B.A., Davidson College, 1970; J.D., Georgetown University, 1974; Law Clerk to Judge
Albert V. Bryan, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 1974-75; Associate
with the law firm of Adams, Porter, Radigan &'Mays, Arlington, Virginia.
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-152 to -217.14 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-218 to -238 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
3. For a discussion of the history of the Virginia inheritance tax see Savage, The Proposed
Virginia Estate Tax, 44 VA. L. REv. 1009, 1010-11 (1958).
4. House Resolution 34, January 19, 1977.
5. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 1902, 2001 to 2010, 90 Stat. 1804-06,
1846-97.
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etc. Tax considerations play an important role in the achievement
of all of these goals and it is axiomatic that planning becomes a
meaningless exercise unless the results are relatively predictable.
Finally, a transfer tax must be judged by its administration. The
ideal tax would be easily collected and enforced with as little ex-
pense and effort as possible for the government and taxpayers alike.
This article will first analyze current Virginia law in light of the
standards just listed. There will follow two alternative estate tax
proposals and a discussion of how the proposals measure up against
the stated standards. The relative merits of the possible forms
which an estate tax might take, including the two proposals, will be
addressed. And finally, a recommendation for the repeal of the Vir-
ginia gift tax in conjunction with the adoption of either of the pro-
posed estate taxes will be made.
I. CURRENT VIRGINIA LAW
Virginia's inheritance and gift taxes should not be changed simply
for the sake of change. Before alternatives are explored the present
tax should be judged against the standards of revenue production,
fairness, predictability, and administration.
Wealth transfer taxes generally do not produce substantial reve-
nue. For example, the federal government collected less than $5
billion in fiscal year 1976 from the estate tax,' compared to the total
federal collections of $302 billion.7 In fiscal year 1976 Virginia's $19
million from inheritance and gift taxes accounted for only 1.5 per
cent of all Department of Taxation revenue collections.8 It has even
been suggested that if raising revenue were the only reason for death
taxes, they would not be worth it? And so the level of revenue per
se is not a factor in judging the Virginia inheritance and gift tax.
On the other hand, consistent revenue production, at whatever
level, is very important within an approved budget period, and will
be discussed in that context.
6. 1976 COMM'R OF INT. REV. ANN. REP. 131.
7. Id. at 130.
8. 1975-1976 VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION ANN. REP. 8.
9. Jatscher, The Aims of Death Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 40-41 (E.
Halbach, Jr. ed. 1977).
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While Virginia's inheritance tax incorporates a graduated rate
schedule,'" the tax is not nearly as progressive as other death taxes.
This raises the question of fairness in the Virginia scheme. For ex-
ample, any property in excess of $5,000 passing to a Virginia Class
A beneficiary is subject to tax under the Virginia inheritance tax,
whereas the value of a gross estate must exceed $134,000 for persons
dying after 1977 before federal estate tax liability obtains. After
1980, a federal gross estate of $175,625 will escape taxation. Of
course, the Virginia inheritance tax exemption becomes more im-
portant as the number of beneficiaries of a decedent increases. On
the other hand, the inheritance.tax exemption decreases for Class
B and Class C beneficiaries. All variables taken into consideration,
it is sufficient to say that a very large number of smaller estates in
Virginia subject to Virginia inheritance taxes are not even required
to file a federal return. Nor does the progressiveness of the Virginia
tax compare favorably to other states. A 1974 study concluded that
a large majority of the other states with an inheritance tax have
more progressive rate structures than Virginia."
It is said that nothing is certain but death and taxes. In Virginia
that truism still applies to death. However, the taxes which arise
from death are anything but certain. Part of this failure of predicta-
bility in the Virginia inheritance tax is characteristic of inheritance
taxes in general. An inheritance tax is a tax on the privilege of
receiving property from the estate of a decedent. As such, a benefici-
ary of a decedent's estate is taxed only on the property received and
not until it is received. This feature of an inheritance tax can pres-
ent any number of problems. A beneficiary may receive an interest
in property which amounts to something less than absolute owner-
ship. Unless actuarial tables are applicable, it may be impossible
to determine accurately the value of such an interest. A remainder
interest which does not vest in a beneficiary until after an event
other than the death of the decedent is not taxable until such vest-
ing. The difficulty is compounded when a beneficiary of a remainder
interest is not identifiable at the time of the death of the decedent.
In all of these cases, the Department may effect a settlement "as it
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-153 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
11. REPORT OF THE REVENUE RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR AND
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S. Doc. No. 13, at 48 (1974).
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shall deem to be for the best interest of the Commonwealth.")'2
Taxpayers are generally anxious to reach a settlement and bring
matters relating to an estate to a conclusion. The Department, too,
would rather settle a tax on a future interest than keep a file open
for generations. But in spite of this mutuality of interests, settle-
ment is not always possible. A trust with particularly broad discre-
tion for distribution by the trustee would present a wide range in
the potential amount of tax due depending on the relation of the
ultimate distributees to the decedent. A settlement in the interest
of the Commonwealth would ipso facto be contrary to the interest
of the taxpayer. In such cases wisdom matching Solomon's cannot
make a settlement satisfactory to all parties, and the ideal of a
certain amount of tax due on a certain date is simply not attainable.
The lack of predictability of the Virginia inheritance tax is also
attributable to the skeletal nature of the Virginia statute itself. The
cornerstone of the statute is the general rule of section 58-152 that
Virginia taxes "the shares of the respective beneficiaries in all prop-
erty within the jurisdiction of this Commonwealth."13 Presumably,
only property otherwise specifically excluded would escape taxa-
tion. But life insurance proceeds payable to a named beneficiary are
exempt from inheritance tax. The policy and practice of the Depart-
ment produce this result rather than any legislative or judicial
directive.
The uncertainty of the Virginia inheritance tax can be traced not
just to the statute, but to the relatively few judicial and administra-
tive interpretations of that statute as well. The problems posed by
this uncertainty are mitigated by the generally fair and consistent
treatment of taxpayers by the Department; but, no sound system
of taxation should ultimately be founded on the benevolence of the
administrator.
Consistency among taxing jurisdictions is a corollary to predicta-
bility. The frustration of effective estate planning caused by contra-
dictqry treatment of property by the federal government and a state
government can be just as great as that caused by a vague or incom-
plete statute. There are many examples of such inconsistencies to
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-173 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-152 (Repl. Vol. 1974)(emphasis added).
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Virginia estates. The treatment of a principal residence jointly
owned by spouses is different for the two taxes. 4 Railroad retire-
ment and civil service survivor benefits and annuities are taxable
under the federal estate tax 5 but excluded for purposes of the Vir-
ginia inheritance tax.'" The federal government allows a marital
deduction'7 and Virginia does not. The federal estate tax gives favor-
able treatment to the property of a decedent which has been subject
to estate tax within the ten years prior to the decedent's death,'8
while the Virginia tax favors such property only if the property was
previously taxes within two years of death.'9 There are more exam-
ples. The point is that intelligent planning becomes difficult, and
in some cases impossible, in the face of so many important instances
of contrary tax treatment by the federal and state taxing statutes.
The administrative difficulties presented by the Virginia inheri-
tance tax are closely related to the problems with respect to predict-
ability. Because the tax is levied against the transferee rather than
the transferor, a separate calculation is required for each beneficiary
of an estate. If the estate includes future interests and a settlement
with the Department is not reached, then the levy of the tax must
be delayed until the interest becomes vested and the tax certain.
This could mean that a file would remain open for years after a
decedent's death. If a decedent grants a trustee authority to make
discretionary distributions with respect to the corpus of the trust a
return would have to be filed upon each invasion of the corpus.
The requirement that the personal representative of every dece-
dent whose gross estate exceeds $1,000 must file a return" obviously
increases the administrative burden of the Department. The bene-
fits derived by Virginia are not concomitant to the burden, particu-
larly when the additional burden borne by smaller estates is consid-
ered. For example, a gross estate of $50,000 with a net value of
$40,000 after debts and administrative expenses, left in equal shares
to two children of the decedent will produce gross revenue to Vir-
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-153 (Repl. Vol. 1974); I.R.C. § 2040.
15. I.R.C. § 2039.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-153 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
17. I.R.C. § 2056.
18. I.R.C. § 2013.
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-156 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-166 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
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ginia of only $300. The revenue derived is insignificant to the state
and probably does not cover the cost to the state of processing the
return. Moreover, the preparation of the inheritance tax return is
technically demanding and time consuming, and its burden is rela-
tively greater on the smaller estates least able to bear it.
The 1976 changes in the federal estate tax will indirectly increase
the administrative burden of Virginia's inheritance tax. Because the
new unified credit2' translates into a $175,625 exemption after 1980,
far fewer federal returns will be required to be filed. Consequently,
Virginia will be less often able to rely upon the federal audit proce-
dure with respect to the valuation of property. The cost to Virginia
of valuing property of smaller estates will increase, and again, those
are the very estates from which Virginia receives the least revenue.
II. PROPOSALS
Two alternative schemes of death taxation for Virginia are pro-
posed to address the disadvantages of the present inheritance tax
just recounted. The proposed alternatives are set out in their en-
tirety in the appendix. Simply stated, the tax from Alternative I
would be 25 per cent of the amount of the federal estate tax liability
of the decedent's estate. Vermont enacted a similar death tax in
1970.22 Under Alternative II, the tax would be equal to the amount
of the credit allowed by section 2011 of the Internal Revenue Code
for state death taxes paid. This latter tax is referred to as a "pick-
up" tax and has been adopted by Alabama, 23 Alaska, 2 Arkansas,25
Florida,2 6 Georgia, 2 New Mexico, 28 and Utah.2 1 It is also proposed
that the Virginia gift tax be repealed in conjunction with the adop-
tion of either of the proposed death taxes.
The revenue effect of any change in the Virginia death and gift
21. I.R.C. § 2010.
22. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 7441 to 7497 (Supp. 1977).
23. ALA. CODE tit. 51, §§ 432 to 449 (1958).
24. ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.31.011 to .430 (1962).
25. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 63-101 to -151 (1947).
26. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 198.01 to .44 (1971 & Supp. 1977).
27. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92-3401 to -3406, (Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 113-1037 to -1040
(Rev. 1974).
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-33-1 to -12 (Supp. 1975).
29. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-12A-1 to -14 (Supp. 1977).
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taxes can be viewed from both a short term and a long term perspec-
tive. If any change were made effective during a biennium for which
the budget has already been established, it would be very important
that the change have no adverse effect on the revenue of the state.
On the other hand, if any change were made effective far enough in
advance so as not to affect current planning, there would be room
for adjustment in a $3.7 billion budget to take account of a prospec-
tive change in revenue from a tax that produces less than $20 mil-
lion. Such an adjustment would likely be something less than a
rending process in view of the projection that in fiscal 1981 the
Virginia general fund collections.will have increased by almost $600
million over the collections expected in fiscal 1978.10
Alternative I as drafted, with its 25 per cent rate applied against
the federal tax, is designed to maintain existing levels of revenue
and could therefore be made effective immediately. Of course, noth-
ing precludes a different rate or effective date for Alternative I. But
since the Alternative H tax, as will be explained, does not have the
flexibility to match the revenue production of the current tax, at
least in the short run, Alternative I is drafted to do so.
Assuring that any new Virginia wealth transfer tax produces reve-
nue for the state at-levels which the old tax would have produced is
much like hitting a moving target. As Table 1 indicates, revenue
from Virginia's inheritance and gift tax over the past 10 years has
fluctuated substantially. But if continuity of revenue is a goal of any
new system of taxation, Alternative I is theoretically the best to
achieve such a goal. Since Alternative I is simply a percentage of
the federal estate tax liability, it is reasonable to assume that a
ratio, the numerator being the amount of Virginia inheritance and
gift tax revenue collected over a period of time and the denominator
being the amount of federal estate tax paid by Virginia decedents
over the same period of time, could be converted to a percentage
which would generate the desired level of revenue. Of course, the
longer the period of time over which the data for the ratio would be
collected, the greater the chance that in the long run the revenue
produced by the new tax would match what would have been col-
30. Letter from Stuart W. Connock, Assistant Secretary for Financial Policy, to the Vir-
ginia House of Delegates Committee on Appropriations and the Virginia Senate Committee
on Finance (Sept. 1977), pursuant to VA. CoDE ANN. § 2.1-393 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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lected by the old tax. Table 2 lists the relevant data over the past
ten years and demonstrates that if Virginia had collected 24.8 per
cent of the amount of federal estate tax paid by Virginia's dece-
dents' estates during that period of time the state's revenues would
have matched what was actually collected. It is suggested, there-
fore, that a single rate of 25 per cent, incorporated in Alternative I
and applied against the federal estate tax liability, would maintain
Virginia's revenue from wealth transfers.31
Alternative I maintains the essence of section 58-162 of the Vir-
ginia inheritance tax, which provides that the minimum tax shall
be the amount of credit allowed against the federal estate tax liabil-
ity by Internal Revenue Code section 2011 for state death taxes
paid. For those cases in which the maximum allowable section 2011
credit would exceed the tax otherwise calculated, the result is addi-
tional revenue for the state without increasing the overall tax bur-
den of the taxpayer since the increased payment to Virginia would
have been paid to the federal government in any event.
If Virginia were to resort to Alternative II there would be a reve-
nue loss, at least in the short run. Since the section 2011 credit
serves as a minimum tax under current law3" the revenue loss would
31. The denominator of the ratio which produced the 25 per cent rate for Alternative I
represents federal estate tax paid by Virginians before the 1976 amendments to that tax. The
report prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation includes estimates of the revenue effect
of those amendments. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Aer OF 1976, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 597 (1976). The report projects that in the short run (through 1981) the new unified
credit and the increased marital deduction will decrease revenue more than the new rule
which carries over to a beneficiary the decedent's basis in capital assets will increase revenue.
But in the long run (18 to 20 years) the report predicts that the revenue gain from the
carryover of basis change will become more significant and produce a net increase in revenue.
Obviously, a change in the federal estate tax collections will have a bearing on the revenue
Virginia would derive from Alternative I. But the projections contained in the Joint Commit-
tee's report have not been taken into account in calculating the Alternative I rate for a
number of reasons. First, they are only projections and subject to error or unforeseen circum-
stances. Second, the projections are not constant, but rather vary with each year. Any com-
pensating factor in the Alternative I rate would likewise have to vary, thus reducing the
simplicity of Alternative I. Third, the projected increase in revenue from the new basis rule
is actually a gain from the income tax rather than the estate tax. Since Virginia's income
tax conforms to the federal income tax, Virginia will benefit from this revenue increase no
matter at what level the Alternative I rate is set. Finally, if experience proves the Alternative
I rate to be too high or too low, its adjustment by the General Assembly would be a simple
matter.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-162 (Supp. 1977).
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be the extent of the excess of the inheritance tax over the section
2011 credit on any given return. The amount of the loss can be esti-
mated: The fiscal 1973 inheritance tax revenue to Virginia was
$15,073,000.13 In calendar year 1973, section 2011 credits reported on
federal returns filed by Virginians amounted to $7,132,000. 31 The
difference, $7,941,000, is not an exact calculation of the revenue
loss. Obviously the fiscal and calendar years do not match. More-
over, the $15,073,000 includes revenue from those returns for which
the section 2011 credit exceeded the Virginia inheritance tax, 5 and
the revenue from such returns would not be lost under Alternative
II. On the other hand, the 1976 federal amendments increasing the
marital deduction and creating the unified credit will have the ef-
fect of decreasing the credit allowed by section 2011 for smaller
estates, thereby decreasing revenue to those states with a pick-up
tax. All factors considered, a good estimate is that Alternative II
would cut Virginia death tax revenues approximately in half.
Alternative I, being a direct function of the federal estate tax
liability, would be quite progressive. Alternative II is even more
progressive than Alternative I since the section 2011 credit increases
more rapidly with the size of an estate than does the federal estate
tax. Yet Alternative II places no greater absolute burden on larger
estates than Alternative I or the current inheritance tax.
The progressiveness of both proposed taxes when compared to the
current inheritance tax is most pronounced with respect to smaller
estates. Assuming an estate avails itself of the maximum marital
deduction under federal law, after 1980 no federal estate tax would
be payable unless the adjusted gross estate exceeds $425,000. The
same would be the case for the state death tax if either of the
proposed taxes were adopted. In contrast, the present Virginia in-
heritance tax is payable by a Class A beneficiary to the extent that
his share exceeds $5,000. Table 3 compares the tax liability under
33. 1975-1976 VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION ANN. REP. 49.
34. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF THE TRESURY, PUB. No. 764, STATISTICS OF INCOME
- 1972 - ESTATE TAX RETuRNs 73 (1975).
35. In any given taxable year the number of Virginia returns for which the section 2011
credit exceeds the inheritance tax is likely to be small, and the amount of that excess in the
aggregate should likewise be insignificant. See REPORT OF THE REVENUE RESOURCES AND ECO-
NOMIC COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S. Doc. No. 13,
at 57-60 (1974).
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the present and proposed death taxes. Assuming no marital deduc-
tion, Table 3 shows that the current inheritance tax for the lower
brackets is higher than the tax for those brackets under either of the
alternatives. Since Alternative I is intended to maintain existing
levels of revenue, relief to the lower brackets is balanced by a greater
relative tax for the higher brackets. When a maximum marital de-
duction is assumed, the inheritance tax again is more burdensome
to smaller estates than either of the alternatives.
Either of the proposed taxes would eliminate the uncertainty of
the Virginia inheritance tax. The tax would be a simple computa-
tion based on the federal estate tax liability or the section 2011
credit. Since the new tax would be an estate tax, it would be based
on the value of the decedent's interest in certain property at the
time of his death. The difficulties characteristic of an inheritance
tax, that is, valuation of future interests and the identification of
beneficiaries, would disappear. So too would the vagaries of the
Virginia inheritance tax concerning life insurance. The treatment of
property would not vary for purposes of state and federal death
taxes.
It follows that the proposed taxes would be more easily adminis-
tered by the Department. First, the audit of Virginia death tax
returns would be reduced to a verification of line 19 on the federal
return and a calculation of 25 per cent of that amount, or, in the
case of Alternative II, a verification of line 13 on the federal return.
Second, the number of returns to be processed by the Department
would be greatly decreased. For example, 17,600 inheritance tax
returns and 5,700 gift tax returns were filed in Virginia in 1976,36
contrasted with only 4,900 federal estate tax returns filed by Vir-
ginia estates7.3 If either of the proposed taxes had been in effect in
1976, the Department would have had to audit an impressive 80 per
cent fewer returns. The difference will be even greater in years to
come since the number of inheritance and gift tax returns is sure to
increase whereas the Internal Revenue Service projects that the
1976 estate tax amendments will reduce the number of federal es-
36. 1975-1976 VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION ANN. REP. 15.
37. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. No. 5395, QUARTERLY STATISTI-
CAL REPORT 6 (April 1977).
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tate tax returns from Virginia to a mere 3,500 by 1980.11 The person-
nel costs for those auditors who now review inheritance tax returns
could be eliminated, or those auditors could be diverted to the in-
come tax division for added revenue production from that tax.
Third, any resolution of a technical or legal dispute on the federal
level would be determinative for Virginia, with a resulting saving of
administrative and judicial review.
Alaska39 and New Mexico"0 formerly had a death tax similar to
Virginia's, that is, an inheritance tax with the minimum tax being
the amount of the section 2011 credit allowed on the federal return.
And so when those states changed to a pick-up tax in 1970 and 1973,
respectively, they expected a revenue loss to the extent of the excess
of the inheritance tax over the section 2011 credit for any particular
return. Alaska and New Mexico made the change despite the antici-
pated revenue loss primarily because of the administrative simplic-
ity of the pick-up tax.4' It is no doubt true that only because the
death tax represents such a small share of state collections are states
willing to sacrifice a cut in revenue for administrative ease. Put
another way, the smaller the amount of revenue realized from a tax,
the more important administrative efficiency becomes.
Any simplification of the Virginia death tax calculation and re-
duction of the number of returns required to be filed would also
relieve those personal representatives and others preparing the Vir-
ginia return, who now must contend with a 12-page inheritance tax
return capped off by a seemingly straightforward, yet confusing and
misleading, rate table. The change to either of the proposed taxes
38. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. No. 6149, CALENDAR YEAR
PROJECTIONS 1977-1985 - DISTRmCTS 18-19 (Jan. 1977).
39. ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.30.010-.210 (1963) (repealed 1970).
40. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-16-1 to -25 (1953) (repealed 1973).
41. The legislative history for most state statutes is sparse at best. Any reference in the
text to the raison d'etre for a legislature's action is founded on the author's conversations with
state officials and has no documentary basis.
42. Schedule K on page 11 of the Virginia inheritance tax return is a series of columns
leading to the calculation of the tax due. That calculation is made by reference to the rate
table on page 12. One would expect the terms of Schedule K to match the terms of the rate
table, but the contrary is the case. Discovering no exact equivalence in the terms, one might
then be led to think that the "net amount" of column 6 of Schedule K is the same as the
"net estate" in the rate table. But no. The "value of share" column of Schedule K is actually
comparable to the "net estate" columns of the rate table, and what is referred to as the "net
1978] 309
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would also eliminate the need for much of the documentation which
now must accompany the Virginia return in many cases, such as:
(1) the will of the decedent; (2) the deed or will creating an estate
in jointly owned property with right of survivorship; (3) Form 44-A
summarizing the federal estate tax return; and (4) demonstration
of the consideration furnished with respect to joint property. With
the proposed taxes, all that need be appended to what would surely
be a simple Virginia return would be the federal return.
It is apparent that many of the difficulties associated with the
Virginia death tax are inherent in an inheritance tax and that many
of the solutions to those difficulties are inherent in an estate tax.
The proposed alternative taxes represent two of the three general
variations of an estate tax. The three general types of estate taxes
adopted by the various states are: an estate tax which "tracks" the
federal tax, such as Alternative I; a pick-up tax like Alternative II;
and an independent estate tax system which usually follows federal
estate tax concepts but without specific reference to the Internal
Revenue Code.
The advantage of Alternative I, vis--vis Alternative II, is its
flexibility for revenue production. While Alternative I as drafted
applies a flat 25 per cent rate against the progressive federal estate
tax, that rate could be changed up or down at any time in order to
increase or decrease death tax revenues. On the other hand, Alter-
native I1 is based solely on the section 2011 credit with no rate sub-
ject to change by the legislature. This advantage of Alternative I
would be more significant if death tax revenues constituted a more
substantial share of total state collections.
The attraction of Alternative II is that the state tax is no more
and no less than the amount which the federal government allows
as a credit against the federal estate tax. The states which have
adopted a pick-up tax boast that they effectively have no state
death tax burden since the tax paid to the state reduces the federal
tax owed by an equal amount. Utah adopted its pick-up tax effec-
tive January 1, 1977 in large part to attract wealthy persons to reside
amount" in Schedule K is equivalent to the "taxable" column of the rate table. The author
is reluctant to reveal his initial confusion in working with the inheritance tax table, but does
so after being reassured by other practitioners that his perplexity is shared.
[Vol. 12:299
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in that state. 3 Vermont, which provides the model for Alternative
I, recently amended its estate tax so that by 1979 virtually all of
Vermont's death tax revenue will be from the section 2011 credit.44
The Vermont legislature made this change knowing that in the short
run there would be a revenue loss, but like Utah, the change was
made to attract persons of wealth.4 5 If states such as Utah and
Vermont are correct in their belief that a pick-up tax will eventually
create a net increase in revenue by the attraction of larger estates,
the advantage of Alternative I over Alternative II as a revenue pro-
ducer may be illusory.
Some states, including Arizona, 4 Mississippi,47 North Dakota, 8
Ohio,4" and Oklahoma," have their own independent estate taxes.
The statutes of these states define gross estate, enumerate deduc-
tions and contain their own rate schedules. Like the proposed taxes,
these estate taxes eliminate the need for a separate calculation for
each beneficiary and obviate the problems associated with future
interests. But unlike the proposed taxes, to the extent that federal
definitions and interpretations are not adopted, separate state audit
staffs must be maintained. Administrative and judicial disputes
will continue. Moreover, the preparation of the return becomes no
less complicated for the taxpayer, and the audit of the return would
be more difficult than under Alternatives I or I.
In 1958, when the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council recom-
mended that Virginia adopt an estate tax in place of the inheritance
tax, that recommendation was accompanied by the proposal that
the Virginia gift tax be repealed.51 For the same reasons and more,
the estate taxes now proposed could be coupled with the repeal of
the gift tax without significant detriment and with some benefit.
The main function of a gift tax is to deter lifetime giving as a
43, See note 39 supra.
44. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §7442 (Supp. 1977).
45. See note 39 supra.
46. ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 42-1501 to -1535 (1956 & Supp. 1977).
47. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 27-9-1 to -61 (1972 & Supp. 1977).
48, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-37.1-01 to -22 (Supp. 1977).
49. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5731.01-.51 (Page, Repl. Vol. 1974).
50. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 801-825 (West 1966 & Supp. 1977).
51. INHERITANCE AND GIFT TAX LAws - A REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, H. Doc. No. 24, at 11-12
(1958).
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means of avoiding death tax liability. The Council in 1958 con-
cluded that any deterrent effect is achieved almost entirely by the
federal gift tax alone and that any consideration given state gift
taxes is little more than an afterthought to the tax planner." The
predominance of the federal gift tax compared to the state gift tax
is even more pronounced today. The 1976 federal changes included
a unified rate schedule for estate and gift taxes. The unified rates
have taken away the most significant advantage to lifetime giving,
that is, a more favorable rate for gifts. Furthermore, while the gross
federal gift tax payable has always overshadowed the state tax, the
federal tax is now even relatively higher. Since the potential federal
tax liability is so much greater than the state tax, it follows that the
federal policy discouraging inter vivos transfers will be served even
without a state gift tax.
The Council further stated that if the revenue loss from the repeal
of the gift tax proved too significant the estate tax rates could be
adjusted to make up the difference.53 It is inconceivable that the
Virginia gift tax in its current form would become a significant
source of revenue. In any event, the single 25 per cent rate to be
incorporated in Alternative I is calculated to raise revenue sufficient
to replace both the inheritance and gift tax. It should also be noted
that lifetime giving dilutes the new federal unified credit, thus cre-
ating greater exposure to federal estate tax liability. Since Alterna-
tive I is keyed to the federal tax liability, the state tax would like-
wise increase, further compensating for the repeal of the gift tax.
Repeal of the gift tax would have salutary effects as well. First, it
would make administration of the tax laws yet simpler and less
expensive. Second, it would make the state's wealth transfer laws
more even in their application. Gift tax laws are very difficult to
enforce. It is submitted that many taxpayers, whether deliberately
or not, unlawfully avoid gift taxes. The replacement of the gift and
inheritance taxes with a single, easily enforceable transfer tax would
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Ill. CONCLUSION
Virginia should repeal its inheritance tax and enact an estate tax.
An estate tax is simpler from the perspective of both the government
and taxpayer. Only one tax is levied per decedent rather than a
multitude of taxes for each beneficiary. Since the tax is based on
the total value of the property of a decedent, and not the value of
shares to each beneficiary, difficult problems involving future inter-
ests and allocations of tax liability are avoided. An estate tax is also
easier to administer and therefore more productive. The most often
repeated defense on behalf of an inheritance tax is its ability to favor
certain classes of beneficiaries, most notably close relatives of the
decedent. But since the federal estate tax, which of course does not
favor classes of beneficiaries, receives the lion's share of the death
tax dollar, any state's policy to that end is defeated.
Two alternatives are proposed as the best form of an estate tax.
The tax imposed by Alternative I would be an amount equal to 25
per cent of the federal tax to ensure that the level of revenue to
Virginia from both inheritance and gift taxes is maintained. The tax
represented by Alternative II would be equal to the credit allowed
by section 2011 of the Internal Revenue Code for state death taxes
paid. Adoption of Alternative II would decrease revenue in the short
run, but eventually could well create an increase. A tax keyed either
to the federal tax liability or to the section 2011 credit would relieve
most smaller estates in Virginia which now pay inheritance tax from
any death tax liability at all. Moreover, such a tax would be emi-
nently simple to administer.
The gift tax should be repealed. Its revenue production is mini-
mal, and can be absorbed by the estate tax of Alternative I. Its effect
in deterring lifetime giving is likewise minimal, and has been fur-
ther diminished by the recent changes in the federal law. The repeal
of the gift tax will further simplify the task of the Department of
Taxation.
1978]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Appendix
ALTERNATIVE I
ESTATE TAXES-SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS GENERALLY
Sec. 1. Name Of Tax. The tax imposed by this chapter shall be
known as the Virginia estate tax.
Sec. 2. Definitions. The following definitions shall apply through-
out this chapter unless the context requires otherwise.
(1) "Transfer" means "transfer" within the meaning of Section
2001 of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended or renumbered, or successor provision.
(2) "Decedent" means a deceased natural person.
(3) "Resident" means a decedent who was domiciled in the
Commonwealth of Virginia at his death.
(4) "Nonresident" means a decedent who was domiciled outside
of the Commonwealth of Virginia at his death.
(5) "Laws of the United States" means for any decedent's es-
tate, the statutes of the United States relating to the federal estate
tax whether enacted before or after this chapter effective for such
decedent's estate.
(6) "Federal estate tax liability" means for any decedent's es-
tate, the federal estate tax payable by the estate under the laws of
the United States after the allowance of all credits against such
estate tax provided by the laws of the United States.
(7) "Federal gross estate" means "gross estate" as defined in
Section 2031 of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
as amended or renumbered, or successor provision of the Laws of the
United States.
(8) "Virginia gross estate" means for any decedent the federal
gross estate, excluding real or tangible personal property which has
an actual situs outside Virginia at the time of the death of the
decedent, and also excluding in the case of a nonresident intangible
personal property owned by the decedent. For purposes of this chap-
ter, a partner's interest in partnership property, real, personal or
mixed, shall be considered intangible personal property.
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(9) "Section 2011" means Section 2011 of the United States
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended or renumbered, or suc-
cessor provision of the Laws of the United States.
(10) "Federal credit" means the maximum amount of the credit
for state death taxes allowable by Section 2011 in respect to a dece-
dent's federal gross estate.
(11) "State" means any state of the United States and the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
Sec. 3. Imposition of Tax. A tax is imposed on the transfer of
the Virginia gross estate of every decedent, resident or nonresi-
dent, dying after June 30, 1978. The amount of this tax shall be
measured by 25 percent of the federal estate tax liability of the de-
cedent's estate, reduced by a percentage equal to the percentage of
the decedent's federal gross estate which is not Virginia gross estate.
Sec. 4. Additional Tax Imposed. (a) A tax in addition to the estate
tax imposed by section 3 of this chapter is imposed upon the transfer
of the Virginia gross estate of every decedent, resident or nonresi-
dent, when the tax as imposed under section 3 of this chapter is a
lesser amount than the federal credit for residents or that portion
of the federal credit as determined below for nonresidents. In any
such case, the estate tax so provided for in section 3 of this chapter
shall be increased by an additional tax on the Virginia gross estate
so that the aggregate amount of the tax due the Commonwealth for
such estate tax as provided in section 3 of this chapter and the
additional tax imposed by this section shall be the maximum
amount of credit allowable for residents or that portion of the maxi-
mum credit allowable as determined below for nonresidents.
(b) In the case of nonresidents the portion of the federal credit
shall be computed as follows:
(1) The percentage which the Virginia gross estate bears to
the federal gross estate shall be ascertained.
(2) The percentage is then to be applied to the total federal
credit allowable to determine the portion of the federal credit alloca-
ble to Virginia.
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ALTERNATIVE II
ESTATE TAXES-SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS GENERALLY
Sec. 1. Name of Tax. The tax imposed by this chapter shall be
known as the Virginia estate tax.
Sec. 2. Definitions. The following definitions shall apply through-
out this chapter unless the context requires otherwise.
(1) "Transfer" means "transfer" within the meaning of Section
2001 of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended or renumbered, or successor provision.
(2) "Decedent" means a deceased natural person.
(3) "Resident" means a decedent who was domiciled in the
Commonwealth of Virginia at his death.
(4) "Nonresident" means a decedent who was domiciled outside
of the Commonwealth of Virginia at his death.
(5) "Laws of the United States" means for any decedent's es-
tate, the statutes of the United States relating to the federal estate
tax whether enacted before or after this chapter effective for such
decedent's estate.
(6) "Federal gross estate" means "gross estate" as defined in
Section 2031 of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
as amended or renumbered, or successor provision of the Laws of the
United States.
(7) "Virginia gross estate" means for any decedent the federal
gross estate, excluding real or tangible personal property which has
an actual situs outside Virginia at the time of the death of the
decedent, and also excluding in the case of a nonresident intangible
personal property owned by the decedent. For purposes of this chap-
ter, a partner's interest in partnership property, real, personal or
mixed, shall be considered intangible personal property.
(8) "Section 2011" means Section 2011 of the United States
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended or renumbered, or suc-
cessor provision of the Laws of the United States.
(9) "Federal credit" means the maximum amount of the credit
for state death taxes allowable by Section 2011 in respect to a dece-
dent's federal gross estate.
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(10) "State" means any state of the United States and the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
Sec. 3. Imposition of Tax. (a) A tax in the amount provided
below is hereby imposed on the transfer of the Virginia gross estate
of every decedent, resident or nonresident dying on or after January
1, 1980.
(b) In the case of a resident, the amount of the tax shall be a
sum equal to the excess of the federal credit over the aggregate
amount of all constitutionally valid estate, inheritance, legacy and
succession taxes actually paid to all other states of the United
States in respect of any property included in the federal gross estate
(not including any such taxes paid with respect to the estate of a
person other than the decedent) which qualify for the credit allow-
able under Section 2011 for such death taxes.
(c) In the case of a nonresident the tax imposed under this sec-
tion shall be an amount equal to the federal credit multiplied by a
fraction, the numerator of which is the value of the Virginia gross
estate and the denominator of which is the aggregate value of the
federal gross estate situate in all states.
(d) Despite the above, the tax imposed under this section with
respect to a decedent who is a resident shall not be less than the
amount of tax which would have been imposed under this section
with respect to such decedent if a nonresident.
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Table 1
VIRGINIA INHERITANCE AND GIFT TAXES COLLECTED
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Table 2
CALCULATION OF RATE FOR PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE I:
PERCENTAGE WHICH STATE TRANSFER TAX BEARS TO
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Table 3
COMPARISON OF CURRENT VIRGINIA INHERITANCE
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*These figures represent the maximum federal credit allowable under
section 2011 for state death taxes paid, since the calculation of the
tax otherwise yields a lesser amount.
1. Adjusted gross estate is as determined for federal estate tax purposes. Assuming no
charitable, marital or orphans deductions, this would also correspond to federal taxable
estate. This chart assumes that there is no life insurance or any other property which might
be taxable for federal purposes but excluded for Virginia purposes, and no property which
might be excluded from the federal gross estate but taxable for Virginia purposes. Accord-
ingly, under these assumptions, the Virginia taxable amount would equal the adjusted gross
estate less federal estate tax payable (assuming the maximum $47,000 federal unified credit
is available).
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2. Assume entire estate passes to one Class A beneficiary. This assumption will overstate
the probable tax due where the net estate passes either outright or to trust for the benefit of
several descendants. This difference is less for Virginia compared with most other states as a
result of the small exemptions allowed and the absence of sharp progression in the rate
brackets in Virginia. For example, the tax on an adjusted gross estate of $5 million (assume
no marital deduction) passing to a single descendant is $127,800, compared with $111,300 if
passing to two descendants equally or $89,300 if passing to four descendants equally. This
difference would become proportionately smaller for larger taxable amounts.
3. Assume the maximum $47,000 federal unified credit is available for calculating the
federal tax. Further assume that the residuary estate bears the burden of death taxes so that
the marital deduction is unaffected by the apportionment of such taxes to the share of the
surviving spouse.
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